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系统重要性金融机构道德风险的形成与监管 被引量:6

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摘要 国际金融危机中,监管当局对陷入困境的大型金融机构面临"两难选择":不救助,其倒闭将带来一系列连锁反应,导致危机蔓延和深化;救助,可能强化其"大而不倒"的预期,引发道德风险。在对现行金融监管体制的深刻反思中,国际组织和有关国家监管当局意识到,救助是应急之举,强化监管才是根本之计,因此纷纷制定出台措施以强化系统重要性金融机构监管,这些改革措施对于进一步完善中国金融监管体制有重要的参考价值。
作者 丁灿
出处 《社会科学战线》 CSSCI 北大核心 2011年第8期87-93,共7页 Social Science Front
基金 教育部"国际金融危机应对研究"应急课题重大项目(2009JYJR001)
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