终极控制、利益一致性与公司价值

Ultimate control shareholders,coherency of shareholders' benefits and corporate value

在我国上市公司终极控制背景下,对代表不同利益一致性的控制权私利的定性与作用进行了理论阐释,并以1998～2006年的数据为样本对代表不同利益一致性的控制权私利作用及其对公司价值的影响进行了研究.结果发现:(1)我国的上市公司当中,存在超额控制权私利和合理控制权私利.(2)超额控制权私利具有侵害性质,会对公司产生负面影响,导致公司价值的贬损;合理控制权私利,它具有补偿和激励作用,对公司产生积极地正向效应,有助于公司价值增加.(3)不同的两权分离度对控制权私利影响公司价值的效用存在明显差异.具体而言,较低的两权分离度,促进了合理控制权私利对公司价值的正向影响;较高的两权分离度加剧了超额控制权私利对公司价值的负面影响.上述研究发现,可以为当前"控制权悖论"以及公司价值与控制权私利间的不确定关系提供一种解释,同时还能为公司治理中控制权私利的相关研究提供一个有益的视角.

We explain in theory how different kinds of private benefits of control represent different coherency of shareholders＇ benefits,under ultimate control structure of China＇s listed companies,and study the different effect of these private benefits of control on the value of a company using data of China＇s stock market from 1998 to 2006.We find that,firstly,there are excessive private benefits of control and reasonable private benefits of control in China＇s listed companies.Secondly,excessive private benefits of control characterized by entrenchment or expropriation would reduce the value of a company and has negative impact on the value of a company,in contrast with this,reasonable private benefits of control characterized by compensation and promotion would increase the value of a company and has positive effect on the value of a company.Further more,the separating degree of company control right affects those process differently,with low separating degree having positive effect,but high separating degree having negative effect.These findings support the primary inference and are useful to further studies in corporation governance.