吉诺竞争与横向合并

Cournot Competition and Merge

在古诺模型的基础上，从策略相互作用的角度分析了横向合并的部分动因。推出了在单纯的古诺竞争中，为获得市场力量进行横向合并的厂商是不盈利的，但当规模效益达到一定条件时合并可获得盈利。得出了生产能力约束成为合并的潜在动力，而且生产能力高的厂商之间更容易发生合并。

This paper studies a part of motives of horizontal merge with the frame of Cournotcompetition. The merge for more market power is unprofitable, but the merge for cost saving can beprofitable. It is found that capacity restriction is another cause of merge, and merge are more likely tohappen for firms with higher capacity. It is a complement to the theory of merge.