摘要
对存在两类消费者情况下的最优非线性定价模型进行了ｎ维推广，展示了一个了解消费者需求分布的厂商如何根据消费者的“自我选择机制”制定出一个可供选择的消费组合菜单。结果表明，厂商大大减少了低需求类型消费者的消费数量，尽可能剥夺更多数目消费者的效用以获取更多的利润。
The model of the optimal nonlinear pricing with two groups of customers is developed inthis paper How monoplists who know customers' demand distribution determine prices according to thesystem of customers' self-selection is shown. It is concluded that the monopolists largely decrease thequantity of low-demand customers and occupy utility of more customers to gain more profits.
出处
《电子科技大学学报》
EI
CAS
CSCD
北大核心
1999年第6期629-631,共3页
Journal of University of Electronic Science and Technology of China
基金
国家杰出青年科学基金!79725002
关键词
产业组织理论
非线性定价
消费
利润
theory of industrial organization
principal-agent theory
non-linear pricing: theory
