政府补贴对大型国有企业研发的挤出效应研究

The Effect of Government Subsidies on the R&D Investment of Large State-owned Enterprises

大型国有企业的所有权性质决定了他们与政府始终保持着某种特殊的政治联系,特殊的政治联系使得大型国有企业能够从政府那里得到更多的政府补贴。过多的政府补贴不仅降低大型国企研发投入的总规模,而且现行的补贴结构也会挤出大型国企的研发投入。本文应用博弈论的相关理论,论证了政府补贴对大型国有企业研发投入的两重挤出效应,并对制造型、研发型和服务型三种类型国企研发投入的挤出效应分析比较,得出政府减少产品补贴的政策能提高制造型、服务型国企的研发投入,但对研发型国企的效果并不明显的结论。

The ownership of large state-owned enterprises determines that they have the special political relation with the government. The special political relationship enables these enterprises obtain more subsidies from government. The excessively subsidies not only reduce the scale of research and development investment of the large-scale state-owned enterprises, but also crowd out enterprises＇ research and development investment. This paper uses the game theory to demonstrates twofold effect of crowding-out due to government subsidies. And we use the game model to make a comparative analysis of the crowding-out effect about manufactural state- owned enterprises, R＆D state-owned enterprises and service state-owned enterprises. We get the conclusion that the government reduce the product subsidy can increase the R＆D invest of manufactural state-owned enterprises and service state-owned enterprises, but it may not work for the R＆D state-owned enterprises.