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影响企业统计数据失真的因素及控制——基于博弈的分析 被引量:3

Factors for the Distortion of Corporate Statistics Data and Approach for Management?——Based on Game Analysis
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摘要 从统计主体的利益出发,采用博弈论的分析工具,设计一个包含造假者与治假者两方的博弈模型,对各统计主体在提供统计数据中的行为做出合理的解释,并需找到有效治假的策略和方法。 This paper starts with the interests of the statistics organization, uses analysis tools of game theory and designs a game model that contains the counterfeiters and those who prevent the fraud phenomenon. The paper also puts forward a reasonable explanation to the behavior of providing the statistical data of the statistical organization, and it' s necessary to find effective strategies and methods to deal with fraud phenomenon.
作者 田梦珍
出处 《科技管理研究》 北大核心 2011年第15期212-215,共4页 Science and Technology Management Research
关键词 统计造假:博弈:治理 statistical fraud game governance
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