经理人激励、多元化决策与企业价值——基于我国上市公司治理结构的理论与实证研究

Managers＇ Incentive, Diversification Decision and Firm Value： Theory and Evidence Based on China＇s Listed Companies

本文对国外的代理成本、多元化经营和企业价值理论加以利用、改造和创新，构建出符合我国上市公司治理结构的“一股独大”下多元化经营效率模型，提出具有原创性的“多元化程度与大股东控股比例呈双曲线特征关系”和“公司价值和多元化程度的关系取决于大股东控股比例”两个命题，然后通过对1999年年底前上市的1026家公司在2000—2006年间的财务报表进行深入细致的调研，运用混合截面回归和系统广义矩法对模型进行实证检验，发现企业多元化的动因在于经理人能够从中获得私有收益；多元化程度是经理人私人收益激励的凹性增函数，是大股东持股比例的凸性减函数。本文的实证结果表明，在大股东持股比例较高的情况下，经理人追求多元化的私有收益使得多元化经营损害了公司价值，是造成公司预期价值与多元化程度呈负相关关系的原因。

This paper sets up a model of diversification which adapts to governance structure of China＇s listed companies. We put forward two original propositions that are respectively ＂degree of diversification and shareholding proportion of major shareholders are hyperbolic characteristic relation＂ and ＂the relation of enterprise value and degree of diversification depends on shareholding proportion of major shareholders＂. Through investigating financial statements during 2000--2006 of 1026 companies listed before the end of 1999, we prove the propositions and find that the motivation of diversification is managers can get private benefit ; the degree of diversification is concave increasing function of managers＇ private benefit motivation and convex decreasing function of share- holding proportion of major shareholders. The empirical results of this paper show that managers chasing private gain of diversification make diversification damage enterprise value under higher shareholding proportion of major shareholders, which is the reason that expected enterprise value and degree of diversification are negatively related.