企业信誉与企业债权融资工具选择

Enterprise Reputation and Enterprise＇s Debt Financing Instrument Selection

本文在Diamond（1991）模型中引入抵押品，研究企业信誉对企业债权融资工具选择的影响。主要结论有：（1）大型企业债权融资的可获得性不受其信誉水平影响；（2）中小型企业只有达到抵押贷款市场的信誉门槛，才能获取债权融资；（3）银行甄别成本足够低时，中小型企业只会选择抵押贷款、信用贷款与信用债券三种债权融资工具。本文的模型能够解释Diamond（1991）无法解释的实证结论，并为国内中小型企业债权融资难问题的解决方向提供政策建议。

This paper examines the effect of enterprise reputation on enterprise＇s debt finan- cing instrument selection by introducing collateral into Diamond （ 1991 ）＇s model. Our basic results are as follows： （i） Large enterprises can always get debt financing aside from their reputation levels; （ii） SMEs（small and medium-sized enterprises） can get debt financing only when their reputation are beyond the minimized requirement for entering into mortgage loan market; （iii） SMEs would raise finance from mortgage loan, unsecured loan or debenture bond market when the screen- ing cost of bank is low enough. This model can explain the empirical results that Diamond （ 1991 ） can＇t. It also provide some policy suggestions for solving debt financing difficulties of China＇s SMEs.