科研项目监理机制代理问题优化路径研究——基于三阶段动态博弈模型

Analysis of Path Optimization under the Agency Problem of Scientific Project Supervision Mechanism——Based on a Three-stage Game Theory Model

运用三阶段动态博弈和"委托—代理理论",对科研项目监理模式下的委托方(市科委)与代理方(项目监理方)之间的委托代理关系进行分析。根据不同的假设条件构造了两类委托方与代理方之间的函数分析模型,在此基础上分析了两博弈方(委托方和代理方)的选择和行为。通过设计合理的相关内外部约束机制,有效抑制代理方容易出现的问题,为我国科研项目监理制度进一步完善提供有益的启示。

The principal-agent relationship between client（ city committee of science and technology） and agency（ project supervisor） under the scientific project supervision institution model is analyzed by applying the three-stage dynamic game and ＂principal--agent theory＂. Two types of function analysis model are established according to different hypothesis, and the players＇ action and choices are analyzed. Well-connected designing of interior and exterior constraint mechanism play sufficient roles in reducing the easily emerging problems of agency ,which provide implications for further healthy development of Chinese scientific project supervision institution.