委托代理及其对网络型产业并购绩效的影响——基于信息技术业的实证证据

Principal-Agent Management and Its Impact on M&A Performance of Network Industry:Empirical Evidence from Information Technology Sectors

本文以信息技术业为例,对网络型产业并购的市场预期绩效和经营绩效进行实证考察。研究表明,并购事件公布所引致的市场异常收益说明中国证券市场属于非半强式有效;委托代理问题的存在使得并购方和目标方的累积异常收益率都会上升;在个人理性和兼容性约束的共同作用下,目标方经营绩效会得到提高,但并购方却出现降低。因此,完善证券市场信息披露制度、建立具有竞争机制的职业经理人市场及引入现代企业制度和公司治理机制,对提高网络型产业并购绩效具有重要意义。

Taking information technology sectors for example,this paper investigates the market expectation performance and operation performance in the network industry mergers and acquisitions（MA）empirically.The results indicate that the abnormal return caused by MA announcement implies that Chinese security market is of non-semistrong-form efficiency;the principal-agent problem increases the cumulative abnormal return of merger companies;based on individual rational and compatible constraints,the performance of target companies will increase but that of mergers companies will decrease.Therefore,it is significant to improve its MA performance by improving information announcement system of security market,constructing competition market of professional managers and introducing modern enterprise system and corporate governance mechanism.