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雇主互惠性、内部营销与核心竞争力的相关性研究——基于苏州、无锡与常州中小型民营企业的数据检验 被引量:3

The Relativity Research among Employer Reciprocity,Internal Marketing and Core Competence——Based on the Data Certification of Middle and Little Private Enterprise of Suzhou,Wuxi and Changzhou
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摘要 互惠性偏好是行为经济学的一个重要思想,认为在现代经济中经济个体会存在一定程度的利他动机,传统的"经济人"假设已不能够合理地分析现实的经济行为。目前,互惠性偏好在中小型民营企业中存在着显著的经济学效应。研究发现:互惠性动机对互惠性行为存在着正向的促进功能,雇主互惠性动机与互惠性行为对内部营销效率的改进与员工忠诚度的提高存在着显著的促进功能,内部营销效率的改进有效地促进了员工忠诚度的提高,内部营销效率的改进和员工忠诚度的提高直接改善了企业核心竞争力的培育效率。互惠性偏好传导效应的实证检验可以为企业加强互惠性文化建设,从而提高企业的运作绩效提供现实性的理论借鉴。 The reciprocal preference is a important idea of behavior economics,which thinks that the economic entity has a certain degree of altruistic motives and the traditional economic assumptions can not reasonably analysis the realistic activities.At present,the reciprocal preference has obvious economic effects especially in the small and medium-sized private enterprise.The reciprocal preference may ultimately enhance the enterprise core competence through the improvement of inner marketing and employee loyalty.The research founds that mutual motivation may promote mutual behavior,and both of two factors may improve internal marketing and employee loyalty,while internal marketing may promote employee loyalty,both of two factors may raise the enterprise core competence.The empirical study of conduction effect may provide the theory reference for private enterprise to strengthen the mutual cultural construction and raise the operation performance.
出处 《技术经济与管理研究》 北大核心 2011年第8期13-16,共4页 Journal of Technical Economics & Management
基金 国家社科基金资助项目(07BJY017):和谐社会的微观经济研究
关键词 互惠性偏好 内部营销 员工忠诚度 核心竞争力 结构方程 Reciprocal reference Inner marketing Staff loyalty Core competence Structure equation
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