政府激励与增长方式转变:信息不对称的视角

Governmental Incentives and Transition of Economic Growth Mode:An Asymmetric Information Perspective

信息不对称在经济增长方式的转变过程中会产生道德风险与逆向选择问题。通过多任务道德风险模型和自愿退出机制的逆向选择模型,可从多级政府间、政府和企业间两方面就信息不对称问题对经济增长方式的影响进行研究。研究表明,信息不对称是我国经济高速增长而增长方式转变未见显著改善的主要原因之一,同时信息不对称也是导致不同地区间存在增长方式转变差距的重要因素。为抑制信息不对称造成的负面影响,上级政府在考核下级政府时应加大对经济增长方式转变的考核权重,建立并完善系统的经济增长方式的评价体系。另一方面,应力避企业隐藏信息的行为,加大对企业转型的转移支付,促进企业生产方式实现从粗放型向集约型的根本转变。

Information asymmetry could lead to moral hazard and adverse selection in transforming economic growth mode. Using the multitask moral hazard model and the voluntary changeover model, we study the impact of asymmetric in- formation on the transition of economic growth mode from two aspects, one being amongst multilevel governments and the other between governments and enterprises. Our findings show that information asymmetry, despite its contribution to Chi- na＇s fast economic growth, is one of the obstacles that has impeded the transition of China＇s economic growth mode and has led to gaps between different regions in terms of transition of economic growth mode. In order to lessen the negative impact of information asymmetry on the transition of economic growth mode, governments of higher levels should apply strict ap- praisal standards to evaluate the efforts of lower-level governments to change economic growth mode and they should con- struct a complete assessment and evaluation system for economic growth. Moreover, bad business conducts such as informa- tion hiding should be prevented and payments to help realize business transformation should be increased in order to facili- tate the fundamental transformation of production mode from extensive to intensive.