摘要
文中基于委托代理理论,构建了包括一个制造商、一个分销商的模型结构,从委托人得到的效用最大化出发,由制造商设计契约,在此基础上选择激励系数以实现整个供应链系统最优的局势。在假设分销商的销售量为努力程度的对数函数的基础上,从信息对称和非对称两个角度构建了供应链的激励机制模型,结合分销商的努力程度、风险厌恶程度、努力成本系数以及市场随机因素,通过设计合理的激励系数,在分销商和制造商之间进行协调,使得各成员在保证自身利益最大化的同时,实现了供应链整体利益最优。
In this paper a model structure including a manufacturer and a distributor is constructed based on principal-agent theory,to start from the principal maximizing personal utilities the manufacturer designs contract,on this basis,a incentive factor is selected to make entire supply chain system achieve optimal situation.Based on the assumption that distributor,s sales volume is logarithmic function of the level of effort,from two points of the symmetric and asymmetric information incentive mechanisms model of the supply chain is constructed,binding the level of effort,the degree of risk aversion,the cost factor of distributor and random factors such as market,by designing reasonable incentive coefficient,it is coordinated between distributors and manufacturers to make overall interests of the supply chain optimal allowing members to maximize their own interests at the same time.
出处
《物流工程与管理》
2011年第7期60-62,共3页
Logistics Engineering and Management
关键词
委托代理
供应链协调
激励机制
模型
principal-agent
supply chain coordination
incentive mechanism
model