强制性披露能提高高管薪酬与公司业绩之间的敏感性吗?——基于上市公司面板数据的经验研究

Did Mandated Disclosure Increase Sensitivity of Executive Compensation to Company Performance?——An Empirical Study on the Panel Data from Listed Companies in China

上市公司强制性信息披露是否能够产生令人满意的经济后果一直是学术界争论的热点。本文选取2004～2006年沪深两市上市公司的面板数据检验了我国2005年颁布的高级管理人员薪酬披露规则对高管薪酬与公司业绩之间的敏感性产生的影响。研究发现,高管薪酬强制性披露规则提高了高管薪酬与公司业绩之间的敏感性,国有企业高管薪酬与公司业绩之间的敏感性提高程度大于非国有企业。这为证券监管部门进一步以强制性披露的方式完善现有高管薪酬信息披露制度提供了经验支持。

Whether mandated disclosure of listed companies can have satisfactory economic results has caused considerable controversy between economists. This article studies the impact of the amended regulation of executive compensation disclosure in 2005 on sensitivity of executive pay to company performance using panel data from companies listed in the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange during 2004 - 2006. This paper finds that, with the imposition of mandated disclosure, pay-performance sensitivity increased, and it increased more in state-owned firms than in non-state-owned firms. Results provide support from empirical research for the securities regulatory departments to perfect information disclosure regulations of executive compensation in mandated disclosure pattern.