基于品牌资产分享的无穷期道德风险契约

Contract of Infinitely Repeated Moral Hazard Based on the Sharing of Brand Assets

为减弱企业(委托人)与员工(代理人)之间长期契约关系的不稳定性,本文研究了基于品牌资产分享的无穷期道德风险契约。在假设品牌这种无形资产来自于代理人高努力下的企业值函数的基础上,建立了一个非线性规划模型,分析了品牌资产分享对契约稳定性的影响。研究发现,最优的契约存在一个内生的品牌资产分享比例,并且最优的长期契约仍然具有鞅性质和记忆性。此外,通过分享品牌资产这种策略,代理人的激励强度增加,期望收益也增加。

To weaken the instability of the long-term contract between an enterprise（principal） and an employee （agent） , this paper addresses a contract of infinitely repeated moral hazard based on the sharing of brand assets. More specifically, on the assumption that the brand assets come from the high effort of the agent, the nonlinearly program model is constructed. Then, the effects of sharing brand assets between the principal and the agent are analyzed. The results show that an endogenous share coefficient exists and the main properties （martingale property and memory property） of the optimal contract remain unchanged. By using the share rule of the band asserts, the incentives power for the agent increases as well as the expected profit of the agent.