论独立批发商职能与流通渠道利益关系的调整

The Role of Wholesalers and Revenue Allocation in Distribution

本文关注制造商处于相对弱势的产批零三环节流通渠道,通过构建理论模型说明:若不存在独立的中间批发商,强势零售商将通过压低市场价格的方式影响其他零售形式的利润,迫使制造商成为其供货商,进而通过组合式的通道费策略占有渠道利益;而独立批发商的行为具有集合供货商势力的作用,这会影响零售商的通道费策略,使渠道利益分配更有利于供货商。本文以中国7省市2004年经济普查食品饮料与烟草行业的数据进行经验分析,结果证实批发、零售两个环节的经营能力分别与制造环节利润率存在正向和负向的影响。因此,在解决当前零供矛盾的过程中,需要综合考虑产批零三个环节,尤其不能忽视独立批发商在平衡渠道利益关系中的特殊作用。

The paper focuses on independent wholesalers which exert influence on the allocation of revenues in a distributional channel,where the suppliers are relatively weaker.The model demonstrates that when there are no independent wholesalers,hypermarkets may set lower retail prices in order to reduce the profits of other retailing forms,force manufactures to be the their suppliers and then use two-part slotting fee contract to gain more profit.However,independent wholesalers can affect the slotting fee strategy of retailers,thus make the situation more favorable to manufacturers.Based on data of food,drink and tobacco industry from 7 provinces gathered in 2004 China Economic Census,an empirical test supports this conclusion,which implies that considerable emphasis should be focused on wholesalers when making distribution related policies.