外资零售业“价签门”事件理论阐析——异质化信息条件下的逆向选择与三方博弈

A Theoretical Analysis on Price-Tag-Gate Event in Foreign Retail Business——Adverse Selection and a Tripartite Game under Heterogeneous Information

文章以近期发生的外资零售业"价签门"事件为背景,深度分析了零售市场中信息不对称条件下"逆向选择"引起的外资零售商价格欺诈行为的理论必然性;在此基础上,进一步构建政府、零售商、消费者三方互动的不完全信息博弈模型,分析零售商价格欺诈行为的发生条件。分析结果表明:首先,竞争市场中的零售商不可能对消费者采取严重欺诈行为;其次,严格的政府市场监管确实能有效杜绝零售商欺诈行为;最后,依据零售商价格欺诈决策条件,政府可以制定全方位的价格监管体系并有针对性地实施价格欺诈防范对策。

Against the background of the recent price-tag-gate event in foreign retail business,this article makes a deep theoretic analysis on the inevitability of price fraud,resulting from adverse selection under the conditions of asymmetric information,of foreign retailers in retail markets.Then a game of incomplete information,in which government,retailers and consumers interact with each other,is designed to analyze how the price fraud of foreign retailers occurs.Results show that it is impossible for retailers in a competitive market to conduct serious price fraud to consumers;secondly,strict government market supervision can indeed completely eradicate fraud of retailers;finally,according to the price fraud decision-making conditions of retailers,the government can build all-round price supervision system and carry out the targeted prevention countermeasure for price fraud.