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公平偏好视角下的行为合约激励理论研究评述 被引量:8

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摘要 作为经济学发展的前沿之一,建立在理性人假设基础之上的合约激励理论在近年来开始将一些行为心理因素引入标准委托-代理分析框架,设计非对称信息下的激励合约,逐渐形成了基于社会偏好的行为合约激励理论。公平偏好作为重要的社会偏好之一,被博弈实验证据反复证明具有重要的经济学意义,而基于公平偏好的激励合约对于实际合约亦具有更强的解释力和指导意义,从而在很大程度上补充和修正了经典合约激励理论。
出处 《西南大学学报(社会科学版)》 CSSCI 北大核心 2011年第4期137-140,共4页 Journal of Southwest University(Social Sciences Edition)
基金 国家社科基金项目"转型期社会偏好理论模型及应用研究"(10CJL024) 项目负责人:覃燕红
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参考文献25

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二级参考文献27

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