摘要
改革开放以来,与经济体制逐渐由计划经济向市场经济转型相适应,我国的财政体制也逐步由集权型向分权型演进。这种演进受到垂直的政治管理体制的约束,由此形成了具有经济分权和政治集权二维属性的中国式财政分权体制,它赋予了地方政府特有的双重激励即财政激励和政治激励,促使地方政府为促进经济增长而展开激烈的标尺竞争。本文试图对财政分权体制下地方政府竞争的激励机制给与理论和经验的系统解释,并揭示其政策含义。
China's financial system has gradually transited from the centralized model to the decentralized model with the economy transforming. In addition, China has both the separation of powers in the economic field and maintaining centralized political field. This special decentralization model gives a double incentive structure to local government-financial incentives and political incentives, which together drive the local government to promote economic growth. This paper explains the incentive mechanism of local government competition under the fiscal decentralization system, and reveals the implication of policy.
出处
《重庆师范大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》
2011年第4期30-38,共9页
Journal of Chongqing Normal University Edition of Social Siences
基金
教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目"转型中的财政分权
地方政府竞争与区际基本公共服务差距:理论
实证与政策研究"(项目编号:10YJC790066)资助
关键词
财政分权
地方政府竞争
财政激励
政治激励
fiscal decentralization, local government competition, financial incentives, political incentives