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内部人动机与业绩预告研究述评

Insiders' Motivations and Earnings Forecast Review
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摘要 国外学者发现上市公司的内部人会对业绩预告产生影响。上市公司的内部人会基于自身利益对业绩预告进行干预,调整市场对企业的预期,进而调整股价,获得自身利益的最大化。基于此,中国应加强内部人动机与业绩预告关系的实证研究以及公司特征对内部人动机影响的研究,利益相关者应该联系上市公司具体特征和其他对外披露的信息,做出合理的投资决策。 Foreign scholars realized that insiders of listed companies will exert influence on the performance forcast. The insiders will make intervention in the performance forcast on account of their own interests. They adjust market's prospect to the enterprises, and then change the stock prices to maximize their own interests. Therefore, China should strengthen the em- pirical research on the relations between insiders' motivation and earning forecast, as well as the research on the influence of company characteristics on insiders' motivation. Stakeholders should corelate the specific characteristics of listed companies and other disclosure information, in order to make reasonable investment decision.
作者 乔君
出处 《广西财经学院学报》 2011年第4期103-106,共4页 Journal of Guangxi University of Finance and Economics
关键词 筹资动机 股权报酬动机 股票交易动机 业绩预告 financing motivation equity compensation motivation stock trading motivation earnings forecast
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参考文献11

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