知识概念与认知实践——从盖梯尔问题谈起

The Concept of Knowledge and the Epistemic Practice——From the Perspective on'the Gettier Problem'

按照传统分析,知识就是得到辩护的真信念。这种分析在20世纪60年代受到盖梯尔的严重质疑。"盖梯尔问题"提出以后,认识论的学者提出了不同的解决方案。总体上看,这些方案可分为两种:一,寻找知识的额外条件,弥补认知辩护的缺陷;二,用其他条件(例如,因果关联条件)取代认知辩护概念。在这篇文章中,我将重点分析几种典型的解决方案。通过对这些方案的分析,我们认为:在实际的认知实践中,我们并不需要一种形而上学的知识概念,因此,"盖梯尔问题"并未对我们的认知实践构成实质挑战。

According to the traditional analysis,knowledge is justified true belief.In 1960s,Edmund Gettier argues seriously against the tradi-tional analysis of knowledge.After＇the Gettier Problem＇was raised,epistemologists have tried to put forward many different approaches.Gen-erally speaking,these approaches can be classified into two categories：firstly,trying to find out the additional conditions of knowledge;second-ly,trying to replace the concept of epistemic justification with other conditions（for example,＇the causal connection condition＇）.In this article,I shall put my emphasis on the analysis into several representative approaches.According to this analysis,we can conclude that in epistemic practice,we do not need a kind of meta-physical concept of knowledge.And in this sense,we can reasonably hold that＇the Gettier Problem＇does not bring a substantial challenge to our epistemic practice.