现象学“先天”的来源及意义——从胡塞尔的波尔扎诺转向谈起

The Origin and Significance of the Phenomenological "A Priori" ——the Discussion from the Bolzano-turn of Husserl

通过胡塞尔的波尔扎诺转向,胡塞尔发现了观念对象的独特存在。与康德对"先天"的理解不一样,现象学先天首先就是一种作为"观念对象"的"对象性先天",它导源于波尔扎诺的"概念先天"。同时,这样一种"对象性先天"还可以进一步被区分为"形式先天"和"质料先天",这同样要归功于波尔扎诺。但胡塞尔对于"先天"的现象学理解并没有完全跟随波尔扎诺。不同于波尔扎诺,胡塞尔强调了"对象性先天"与"意向行为"之间的本质联系。与胡塞尔一样,舍勒也接受了"对象性先天",但是他对胡塞尔的先天理解进行了进一步地批判反省。在他看来,尽管胡塞尔正确地摆脱了"庸常"的"柏拉图主义",但还是陷身于新式的、逻辑学意义上的"柏拉图主义"之中。舍勒对胡塞尔所强调的"相关性先天"进一步彻底化,进而发展出"相关性原理"。对在"显现和显现者"之间的这种"相关性"或"相关性先天"的凸显恰恰是现象学超出波尔扎诺而成其为现象学的地方。

Husserl finds the unique being of ideal object through his Bolzano-turn. Distinct from Kant＇ s understanding of ＂a priori＂, the phenomenological a priori is firstly an objective apriori as ＂ideal object＂, which comes from ＂conceptual a priori＂ of Bolzano. At the same time, the objective apriori can be further divided into ＂formal a priori＂ and ＂material a priori＂, which thanks to Bolzano as well. But Husserl does not entirely follow Bolzano in the phenomenological understanding of a priori. Unlike Bolzano, Husserl stresses the essential connection between ＂objective apriori＂ and ＂intentional act＂. Scheler accepts ＂objective apriori＂ as Husserl does, but critically reflects on Husserl＇s understanding of apriori. In Scheler＇s view, Husserl falls in a new type of Platonism in logical sense although he correctly frees himself from ＂the ordinary Platonism＂. Scheler completely develops the ＂relative apriori＂ which Husserl stresses, and then develops the ＂relative principle＂. Fundamentally, the highlight of ＂the relativity＂ or ＂relative apriori＂ between ＂appearance and the appearing＂ makes phenomenology surpass Bolzano＇s theory. And, the phenomenology is impossible without ＂the relativity＂ or ＂relative apriori＂.