摘要
由土地资源属性和制度决定,国有土地供应出让中形成了受到土地利用规划约束和上级政府管制,由数百个城市"寡头厂商"组成的土地一级供应市场,并产生了诸多策略行为和机会主义做法。本文运用2003-2008年282个城市面板数据的单方程和联立方程空间计量模型,检验了城市政府围绕土地供应市场份额的策略互动影响、土地信贷融资和土地出让垄断利润的数量关系,并据此构造目标供应量、实际收益和惩罚三者相结合博弈策略选择空间,以形成激励地方政府改善土地供应的财政约束机制。
Constrained by the propernes oi tanu state-owned land supply and transfer have formed the primary supply market composed of hundreds city-based oligopolistic enterprises, which is also subject to the land-use planning constraints and the regulation of higher-level governments, leading to strategic and oppor- tunistic behavior. Using single and simultaneous spatial econometric models based on the panel data of 282 cities in China from 2003 to 2008, this paper examines the strategic interac- tion among local governments concerning relative market share and the quantitative relation- ship between land credit financing and monopolistic profits of land transfer, and accordingly constructs a strategy choice space with the combination of target supply, real benefits and penalties, in order to form fiscal restraint mechanism which encourages local governments' improvement of land supply.
出处
《上海财经大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》
CSSCI
北大核心
2011年第4期75-81,共7页
Journal of Shanghai University of Finance and Economics
基金
江苏高校优势学科建设工程项目
国家自然科学基金项目(70663012)
教育部人文社会科学青年基金项目(09YJC790137)
南京财经大学科研基金项目(C0806
A2010001)
关键词
国有土地供应
土地信贷融资
寡头垄断
财政调整
联立空间计量
state-owned land supply
land credit financing
oligopolistic market
fiscal adjustment
simultaneous spatial econometrics