基于有限承诺审核的信息传递均衡策略
摘要
在隐性信息传递中,信息接受者有可能得到信息传递者无法获得的隐性信息,造成双方信息不对称,从而影响到交易效率。文章在完全信息条件下,对信息传递双方基于信息传递者有限承诺审核基础上的混合策略均衡及影响进行了研究。
出处
《统计与决策》
CSSCI
北大核心
2011年第16期50-52,共3页
Statistics & Decision
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