摘要
中央银行维护金融稳定的能力建立在其能够为市场提供流动性这一特有能力的基础之上。事实上,金融危机期间,各国央行一方面通过调整自身的资产负债表而创造流动性以支持金融系统正常运转;一方面动用最后贷款人职能对个别机构进行救助。需要注意的是,大规模流动性供给和救助行为并非是"最优"的选择,其对经济金融失衡的影响、对公平效率的损害,以及由此带来的通胀压力和政策外溢效应不容忽视。
The ability of central bank to maintain financial stability is based upon its unique ability to provide liquidity to the market. In fact, during the financial crisis, central banks of different nations created hquidity to ensure normal fimction of financial system through adjusting its asset liability, and assist individual insti- tutes by virtue of final lender function. It should be mentioned that massive liquid supply and assistance ac- tivities are not the optimal choice, because their effects on economic and financial imbalance, damages on fairness and efficiency, inflations pressures and policy overflow effects must not be ignored.
出处
《财经科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2011年第9期7-15,共9页
Finance & Economics
关键词
流动性供给
最后贷款人
金融稳定
次优选择
Liquidity Supply
Final Lender
Financial Stability
Secondary Choice