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基于进化博弈的城市中心区交通拥堵收费分析 被引量:2

Analysis of Traffic Congestion Toll in Downtown Area Based on Evolutionarily Stable Strategy
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摘要 交通拥堵收费是解决道路拥堵问题的有效措施。假设使用小汽车到达拥挤收费区域边界的出行者可通过2种方式到达拥挤收费中心区:小汽车直达及停车换乘公共交通(P&R)。对于出行者甲(对小汽车出行需求偏刚性)、乙(对小汽车出行需求偏弹性),采用进化博弈的方法,建立效益矩阵,分析在不同政府定价条件下两者出行方式选择行为的演化模型。结果表明,政府交通拥堵收费对出行者出行方式选择行为的演化起着重要作用,不同的定价区间会使得出行方式向不同的稳定状态演变。分析各种定价区间下出行者出行方式选择行为。 Traffic congestion toll is an effective method to reduce road congestion. Supposing private car travelers who want to enter, into city central area arrive at the vehicle passageways by car, they have two trip modes to choose: one is to keep driving to city central area, the other is to park first and then transfer to public traffic. According to the differences among traveling behaviors, this paper utilizes the evolutionarily stable strategy. A beneficial matrix is constructed so as to analyze the evolutionary game model of choice behaviors under different levels of congestion tolls. The result shows that congestion toll plays an important role in the evolutionary process. Different ranges of congestion toll will lead the behaviors to evolving into different stable states. This paper also analyzes choice behaviors under different conditions.
出处 《交通信息与安全》 2011年第4期80-83,91,共5页 Journal of Transport Information and Safety
关键词 交通需求管理 拥堵收费 进化稳定策略 traffic demand management congestion toll evolutionarily stable strategy
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