大股东控制、非效率投资与上市公司治理——基于中国上市公司的经验数据

Large Shareholders Control,Inefficient Investment and Governance of Listed Companies:Based on Empirical Data of China's Listed Companies

以中国上市公司2007—2009年数据为样本,考察了股权分置改革后上市公司大股东控制与非效率投资及公司治理之间的关联。研究表明:中国上市公司非效率投资现象严重,且总体表现为投资不足;控股大股东与非效率投资之间呈现非线性关系;第二大股东能抑制过度投资行为,但也进一步导致投资不足;股权集中度与非效率投资呈正向关系;董事长与经理人合谋会导致非效率投资,而相互监督则能抑制非效率投资;国有控股上市公司更易产生非效率投资;产品市场的竞争程度会使上市公司加大投资,抑制投资不足。

Based on the sample data 2007—2009 of China′s listed companies,the article explores the relationship between large shareholders control,inefficient investment and governance of listed companies after the completion of share reform.The results show that the inefficient investment of China′s listed companies is serious and the general situation is underinvestment;the relationship between major shareholders and inefficient investment is non-linear;the second largest shareholder can curb excessive investment behavior,but also leads to further underinvestment;ownership concentration is positively correlated with inefficient investment;the collusion between chairman and manager will lead to inefficient investments,and mutual supervision is able to inhibit inefficient investments;state holding listed companies are more prone to having inefficient investment;competition in product markets will make listed companies increase investment and,thus,inhibit underinvestment.