中国工业水污染的理论研究与实证检验

A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of China's Industrial Waste Water Pollution

随着我国经济社会的发展及工业化水平的提高,大量的工业废水未经处理直接排入河流,这对水资源造成严重的污染,而征税、管制或者排污权交易等治理污染手段没能够有效遏制我国水质继续恶化的趋势。通过剖析我国工业水污染产生的内在原因,提出我国工业水污染是地方政府、企业和公众在政治市场上博弈的结果假说。采用1997年—2008年我国30个省市的动态面板数据,利用广义矩(GMM)方法对"政府-企业-公众"的博弈模型进行环境污染实证检验,得出地方政府与企业的合谋是导致工业水污染的重要因素的结论。

With the rapid urbanization and industrial growth, a large amount of industrial waste water has been dumped into rivers without appropriate disposal, thus causing serious pollution to rivers. Taxation, control and emissions trading can not curb the deteriorating situation of water pollution in China. In order to analyze a real logic of water pollution, the paper considers that the game among governments, enterprise and the public in political market lead to such a dilemma. We make an empirical analysis about competition model by using China＇s provincial dynamic panel data from 1997 to 2008 and the method of GMM on the environmental pollution. Eventually, we draw a conclusion that conspiracy between local government and enterprises is an important reason for the industrial waste water pollution.