薪酬激励嵌入审计对内部资本市场效率的影响

Impact of auditing embedded in incentive compensation on internal capital market efficiency

基于内部资本市场配置效率由企业内部资金配置决策有效性决定的认识,在标准实物期权模型的基础上构造了内部资金配置决策模型,研究内部审计在资金配置决策中的作用.结果显示,CEO薪酬激励是提高内部资本市场配置效率的最重要手段之一,但是仅依靠薪酬激励通常只能使内部资金配置达到租金抽取与效率权衡后的次优结果,有必要嵌入审计过程以实现和强化激励机制的约束性.分析表明,内部审计的管理审计业务比财务审计业务更有利于提高内部资本市场配置效率.

Internal capital market allocation efficiency depends on the effectiveness of internal capital allocation decisions.Based on the standard real options model,we construct an internal capital allocation decisions model and emphasize that internal auditing plays an important role in internal capital allocation decisions.Our results suggest that CEO compensation incentives can be effective in ameliorating inefficiencies in internal capital allocation decisions.However,we cannot help but achieving sub-optimal result which is a trade-off between rent extraction and allocation efficiency.Thus,it is necessary to embed auditing into compensation incentives to bind them.We find that managerial auditing is better than financial auditing in improving efficiency.Finally,we verify the results of our model with an example of Nanjing P Group.