摘要
本文以Modelski的霸权周期论为重要假设,构造了一个动态优化模型揭示世界经济霸权国家在霸权周期内的行为特征:通过稳定的对外掠夺量来最大化净收益。从该模型可以引出两个假说:如果技术和制度对经济增长的贡献不变,霸权国家在霸权周期初期的经济增长率高于前一时期;在霸权结束后一段时间内的经济增长率低于前一时期。荷兰、英国和美国的历史经验总体上支持两个假说。
This paper, making Modelski' s theory of hegemony cycle a hypothesis, constructs a dynamic optimization model within the framework of revenue-cost to explain economic hegemony powers' behavior in the hegemony cycle. This model reveals that in the whole cycle, hegemony powers maximize net revenues through a stable robbery. From this model, it gets two hypotheses: if the contribution of technology and institution is constant, in the initial stage of cycle, hegemony powers have a higher rate of economic growth; after the collapse of hegemony, its economic growth rate is down. Empirical data from the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States generally supports both hypotheses.
出处
《国际贸易问题》
CSSCI
北大核心
2011年第9期169-176,共8页
Journal of International Trade
基金
2008年广东高校优秀青年创新人才培育项目(WYM08060)阶段性成果
关键词
霸权国家
霸权周期
掠夺
经济增长率
Hegemony power
Hegemony cycle
Robbery
Economic growth rate