摘要
政治晋升是中国地方官员治理的重要内容。如何从晋升激励的视角出发阐释地方政府的经济行为,从而对中国经济增长进行"政治——经济"的分析,这正受到越来越多经济学者的关注。文章结合中国地方官员治理机制中与政治晋升相关的三方面重要制度安排(晋升集权、相对绩效考核、隐性治理机制),对晋升激励增长绩效的经济学文献进行了一个系统的梳理。
Political promotion "plays an important role in local government official's governance. How to carry on a political-economy analysis of China' s economic growth by investigating local government' s economic behavior from the angle of political promotion incentive is attracting more and more economists' attention. Based on three important institutional arrange- ments of China' s local government official' s political promotion (including centralization of promotion; relative performance evaluation and implicit governance mechanism), this article gives a systemic survey on economics research of China's political promotion incentive and its growth performance.
出处
《华东经济管理》
CSSCI
2011年第11期43-48,共6页
East China Economic Management
关键词
晋升激励
地方官员行为
经济增长
political promotion incentive
local government official' s behavior
economic growth