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成长性、代理冲突与公司财务政策 被引量:47

Growth Opportunities, Agent Conflicts and Corporate Financial Policies
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摘要 本文基于成长性、代理冲突与公司财务政策之系统关联的多维视角分析,着眼于将成长性差异作为一个关键变量时,考察其是否可以成为影响公司代理冲突及其治理与公司财务政策选择的一个重要基础。本文理论分析表明:作为一种制度环境———尤其是作为新兴/转轨经济国家行业与公司的典型特征,成长性差异显著影响公司财务政策;公司治理与公司业绩的关系受制于成长性的高低,成长性通过投资决策、融资选择与股利政策等关键财务政策的中介作用影响公司治理与其价值的相关性;在财务政策中投资决策更具有基础性,融资政策与股利政策都基于提高投资效率而进行选择,将成长性差异影响与公司投资决策相结合、或在公司的投资等关键财务政策的研究和实践之中深入考量成长机会影响,将使得代理冲突及其公司治理更具有针对性和有效性;高成长性可以成为公司治理环境改善的一种有效基础,深入关注(高)成长性的显著"公司治理效应",可以为公司代理冲突及其治理、以及其投融资选择等关键财务政策提供更为清晰的决策信号。 Based on the perspective of diverse analysis in the interactive effects among growth opportunities, agent conflicts and company's financial policies, and focus on the key role of firm’s growth opportunities, this paper examine whether it can be an important foundation that affect the company's agency conflicts and their treatment, and the choices of firm's financial policies? Our theoretical analysis confirms the above expectations. We find that: a)As an institutional environment, especially as the industry and the company's typical characteristics of emerging economies, the growth differences significantly affect the company's financial policies. b)The relationship between corporate governance and company performance is subject to the level of growth, and growth exerts on the above correlation through the intermediary role of investment decisions, dividend policy, financing options or other key financial policies. c) Investment decision-making plays a more fundamental role in company's financial policies, the choices of financing or dividend policy are all based on the improvement of firm’s investment efficiency; Combined the influence of growth differences with company’s investment decisions or deeply considers the impact of growth opportunities enables the agency conflicts and its corporate governance to be more effective. d) High growth can be an effective basis in improving corporate governance environment, and the in-depth consideration of the 'corporate governance effect' of (higher)growth opportunities would provide more clear decision signals for company's agency conflicts and their treatment or other key financial policies.
出处 《会计研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2011年第8期40-45,96,共6页 Accounting Research
基金 国家自然科学基金项目(70962005) 教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划(NCET-08-0919) 教育部人文社会科学研究项目(09YJA630103) 教育部人文社会科学研究项目(10YJC790279) 石河子大学211工程重点学科建设项目的资助
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参考文献47

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