政府控制对审计质量的双重影响

Dual Effect of Government Control on Audit Quality

本文从上市公司和会计事务所的产权性质与区域属性的角度,研究了政府控制对审计质量的影响。研究发现,国有企业和本地会计事务所审计的公司的盈余管理水平较低;而较低的盈余管理水平能够降低审计师出具非标意见的概率;同时,国有企业在控制了盈余管理水平的情况下,其得到非标意见的概率相对要低。研究结果表明,政府控制对审计质量的影响具有双重性:一方面,政府控制增强了会计事务所的"本土知识"优势和抵御公司压力的能力,进而提高了公司报表质量;另一方面,政府控制依据它对审计市场的控制降低了出具非标意见的概率,损害了审计质量。

The primary goal of this study is to examine the effects of government control on audit quality. We find that compared with non-state-owned firms, the level of earnings management is lower in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and so do the companies that audited by local auditors. Moreover, lower level of earnings management can bring down the probability of audit qualifications, but allow for the difference in earnings management, the SOEs still receive less modified opinions than non-SOEs. To conclude these results, the effects of government control on audit quality have dual characters. On one hand, the government enhances the local knowledge of firm to inhibit its clients’ earnings management. On the other, the government suppresses the propensity of firms to issue modified opinion.