摘要
【目的】分析绿色信贷实施中存在的问题和实施效果不佳的原因,并提出相应的对策建议,以推动我国绿色信贷政策的全面实施。【方法】利用博弈模型,对绿色信贷实施过程中银行与企业、政府与企业、政府与银行之间的关系进行分析,并提出相应的对策建议。【结果】政府和企业的纳什均衡与污染企业被查处后缴纳的罚款及政府对污染企业进行查处后通报给银行所要支付的监督考察成本有关,对污染企业的惩罚越严重,缴纳的罚款越多,企业治污的概率就越大;企业查处并通报给银行的成本越高,企业治污的概率就越小。政府与银行之间的纳什均衡与双方各自的收益和成本有关,只要降低政府查处成本,提高银行执行绿色信贷政策的收益,就能促使双方在绿色信贷政策执行过程中的协调合作,从而改善社会、经济和生态环境。【建议】应加大环境监管力度、政府提供治污补贴或租金、规范绿色信贷机制约束外的融资方式、银行应制定配套政策并提高自身的社会责任意识、促进企业产品升级并增强企业的社会责任意识等,以推动我国绿色信贷政策的全面开展。
[Objective]The present studies were performed to analyze the current problems hindering the implementation of green credit policy in order to facilitate the implementation of green credit policy. [Method]The game theory was used to analyze the interests between bank and enterprise, government and enterprise, and government and bank in the implementation of the green credit policy. Based on the analysis, some suggestions have been put forward. [Result]The Nash Equilibrium between government and enterprise was found to be related with the fine imposed by the government upon the polluting enterprises and the supervision and inspection cost paid to the government by them. In other words, the more fine government imposed upon the enterprise, the more probability enterprise treated pollution. The Nash Equilibrium between government and bank was related to the profit and cost of each other. Reduction in cost of supervision and inspection by government and increase in profits of bank through implementing the green credit policy could promote the cooperation between government and bank for implementing green credit policy and improving the socio-economic and ecological environment. [Suggestion]In order to promote the implementation of green credit policy, some countermeasures have been proposed, which included strengthening the supervision of environmental contamination, offering government subsidies to enterprises for controlling pollution, standardizing other financial methods, formulation of corresponding policies, upgradation of enterprise products, improvement in consciousness and social responsibility of pollution control, etc.
出处
《南方农业学报》
CAS
CSCD
2011年第8期1025-1028,共4页
Journal of Southern Agriculture
基金
四川农业大学创新型实验计划项目(00409207)
关键词
绿色信贷
参与主体
博弈模型
发展对策
green credit
main participants
game model
countermeasures