风险规避与一级密封拍卖的有限腐败——模型及实验

Risk Aversion and the Limited Corruption in First-Price Sealed Auctions:Model and Experiments

在风险中性假设的有限腐败一级密封拍卖模型基础上,构建容纳风险规避的有限腐败一级密封拍卖的一般模型,依据模型进行基于计算机局域网的多组并行的实验室实验;实验包含一个作为基准的无腐败一级密封拍卖和三种有限腐败程度的一级密封拍卖,并设计两种收益计算方式和保留价设置,实验研究对比两种模型的预测力,考察存在有限腐败的一级密封拍卖的效率和竞标人行为。研究结果表明,有限腐败机制不影响一级密封拍卖的效率,成交价格方面有腐败与无腐败的拍卖之间没有显著差异;腐败者的期望收益有所上升,高报价更为激进而低报价更为保守;腐败者是异质的,其报价行为具有禀赋依赖性;非腐败者的行为和卖者收益没有显著变化。实验结果表明包含腐败者风险规避特征的模型预测力更好。

A first-price sealed auction model of general limited corruption, which includes risk aversion, has been created based on first-price sealed auction model of risk neutral limited corruption. Parallel lab experiments were done on LAN based on above models. The experiments included a non-corruption first price sealed auction as a benchmark and limited corruption first-price sealed auctions with three corruption degrees, two payment methods and reserve price treatments were designed. Forecast capa- bilities of the models were tested; the efficiency and bidders＇ behavior in first-price sealed auctions with limited corruption were studied. The study finds that the efficiency of first-price sealed auctions isn＇t lowered with limited corruption. In addition, there is no distinct of final prices between corruption and non-corruption auctions. When the briber＇s expected profit is higher, her first bid is higher（ but the second bid is lower）. Bribers are heterogeneous. There exists endowment dependent effect among bribers＇ bidding behaviors. The experimental results show that the prediction ability of risk aversion model is better.