基于羊群行为的挤兑机理评述被引量：1

Review of Run Herding

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摘要以挤兑羊群行为发生机理和防范措施为主线,对内生特性、太阳黑子、经济基础恶化、信息等挤兑机理进行研究,以及对暂停支付、存款保险、流动性支持、信息披露、政府管制等防范措施进行了分析。结论表明,内生特性及经济恶化理论不能解释挤兑发生的随机性、非理性,太阳黑子过于神秘,而信息挤兑机理克服了上述缺陷;暂停支付是低效的,存款保险会产生道德风险,在流动性支持下的银行更有动机进行过度风险投资,信息披露能防止挤兑发生。 Based on the mechanism of run and precautionary measures, endogenous characteristics, sunspots, bad economics, information, etc. are studied ; suspension of convertibility, deposit of insurance, liquidity provision, closure of information, regulation, and so on are analyzed. It is concluded that the random and irrationality of run are perfectly explained by information while the others cannot. Disclosure of information is effective while suspension of convertibility is ineffective, moral hazard may emerge when deposit of insurance is carfled out, and banks may be initiated to take too excessive liquidity risks when liquidity provision is provided.

作者李思慧邹新月颜向农

机构地区湖南安全技术职业学院湖南德雷机电工程有限公司广东商学院金融学院

出处《湖南科技大学学报（社会科学版）》 CSSCI 北大核心 2011年第5期55-59,共5页 Journal of Hunan University of Science and Technology(Social Science Edition)

关键词挤兑羊群行为信息随机性非理性 run herding information random irrationality

分类号 F83 [经济管理—金融学]

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