我国瑕疵出资股权的限制问题研究

The Research on Restriction of Lacking Capital Contribution in China

我国《公司法》针对瑕疵出资问题着重采用事后填补式的规范予以规制。但由于瑕疵信息分布状况的隐蔽性及小股东的集体行动困难导致此类规则在实践中的实效不甚理想。我国商业实践中已自发演化出诸多限制瑕疵股权行使的鲜活案例。限制瑕疵股权行使的方式能够强化实缴出资股东在出资监控中的博弈能力,从而改变股东意图瑕疵出资的负向激励,使各方当事人的权利配置达致激励相容。为此,应当由立法对瑕疵出资的股权予以限制,以解决"瑕疵股权限制协议"的公共物品供给不足问题。

According to the corporate law in China,the problem of lacking capital contribution is usually regulated through a method of filling the capital after the corporation is set up.However,for the concealment of investors＇ background information and the difficulty of the small shareholders＇ collective action,such rules fail to produce a good effect.In our commercial practice,there are many cases in point aiming at limiting the flawed shareholder＇s rights.Limiting flawed shareholder＇s rights actually can strengthen the ability of the other shareholders-who had contributed enough capital-during the whole process of monitoring the capital contribution,which may promote investors to pay full funding to the corporation.As a result,the configuration of rights on all parties is compatible.Therefore,the investors with unfinished funds to pay should be limited in their shareholder＇s rights by legislation;this can solve the short supply problem of public goods in the flawed-stock rights-limiting agreement.