集中治污模式下的中小企业排污定价模型

Pricing Model of Pollutant Emission for Small-and-Medium-Size Enterprises under Centralized Pollution Control Mode

建立了中小企业与治污公司的博弈模型,研究了集中治污模式的实施条件以及排污价格的制定,对比分析了单独治污和集中治污模式下的中小企业产量、利润、治污企业利润以及社会福利。研究表明:在集中治污模式下,若实行完全市场化运作,则会降低社会福利,出现"市场失灵"的现象。因此,政府应进行干预,设置排污定价上限,提高社会福利。在政府干预下的集中治污能提高中小企业产量和社会福利,是一种更好的治污模式。

For a group of small-and-medium-size enterprises （SME）, pollution can be controlled by the individual enterprises in an autonomous mode or by a specialized pollution control company in a centralized mode. The objective of this paper is to analyze the effectiveness of pollution control under the centralized mode. A game model is derived to describe the relationship between the SMEs and the pollution control company. Based on this model, the production output and profit for the SMEs, the profit for the pollution control company, and social welfare are analyzed for both pollution control modes. It is shown that, with the centralized mode, if market-oriented policy is applied the social welfare decreases and the centralized pollution control fails. However, with the centralized mode, the production output of SMEs and social wel- fare increase if there is government intervention by setting the upper bound of emission price. A method is presented for setting the upper bound of the emission price.