阿伦特人权现象学探微

On Arendt's Phenomenology of Human Rights

古典人权理论的本质主义立场将人权归结为人所固有的权利,而忽略了人权得以实现的条件,从而使人沦为没有任何身份的"赤裸生命",最终导致人权在现实中很难得到有力的保障。阿伦特从现象学的视角出发,以其富有争议的方式对当代的自明之理提出了挑战,反对用固有的理论范畴来解释人类历史的经验,强调采用新的方式朝向实事本身,重新考虑人权的条件,也即共同体的基础性作用。这种对当代自明之理的尖锐挑战,为我们反思人权问题提供了新的可能性。

The essentialist position of the classical theory of human rights regards human rights as inherent but ignores the conditions of the realization of human rights.By this theory,human being descends to 'bare life' with no identity and eventually it is difficult for human rights to get forceful guarantee in reality.From the perspective of phenomenology,Arendt opposed to using the existing theoretical category to explain the history of mankind,and strongly proposed to find new ways towards things themselves and to reconsider the conditions of human rights,namely the fundamental role of a community.This grim challenge against contemporary truism provides a new possibility for us to reflect on the issues of human rights.