官员异质性、努力扭曲与隐性激励

Official Heterogeneity,Incentive Distortion and Implicit Incentive

学术界多从晋升激励角度解释地方官员发展经济的热情。但是经典的晋升激励模型存在着激励扭曲。激励扭曲可以分为努力方向扭曲和努力程度扭曲,现有文献对于前者给予了高度关注,而对于后者则有着较大的研究空白。通过将官员异质性因素引入传统的晋升激励模型,可以从理论上发现地区资源禀赋、行动次序等因素都会引起官员努力程度的扭曲(即"偷懒")。但是现实中,各地官员却有着高涨的发展经济的激情和GDP崇拜。理论与现实出现了一定的差异,问题的关键在于官员隐性激励。在封闭的政治内部劳动力市场上,由声誉激励构成的隐性激励也是促使地方官员努力发展本地经济的重要机制,它构成了显性晋升激励的有效补充,使得地方官员不至于产生那些努力扭曲。

Some researchers explain the local officials＇ enthusiasm for developing economy is always from promotion incentive. The classical promotion incentive model has the incentive distortion. The literatures existed pay no attention to the distortion of effort＇s level. Official heterogeneity, such as resources endowment and action order, can cause the distortion of officer effort. But it is right theoretically. Every official also has the passion to promote the economic growth of his area because of implicit incentive. The implicit incentive, which encourages the local official to develop economy,is the effective supplementary of the explicit promotion incentive in the political internal labor market.