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民营企业政治竞争力的微观结构与动态演化特征——基于动力学分析框架的新视角 被引量:8

Research on the Microstructure and Dynamic Evolution of the Political Competition of Private Firms
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摘要 本文突破了定性分析和定量分析的静态研究模式,基于动力学分析理论提出了民营企业政治关联研究的新视角,建立了民营企业政治竞争力的微观结构和动态演化理论分析框架。我们首次提出民营企业政治竞争场模型,并创建竞争场能、竞争场信息熵的概念和理论模型。同时,给出了民营企业政治竞争场的高斯定理与环路定理,并证明了竞争场信息熵的凸性定理及极大熵原理。本文的研究不仅有助于深入认识民营企业的政治竞争力,促进学术界对民营企业政治关联的探讨,而且有助于民营企业更深刻地了解中国的政治环境和市场环境,并制定更加有效的政治战略,以促进企业竞争能力和企业价值的提升。 Breaking through the statics research model of qualitative and quantitative analysis, this paper presents the new perspective on the political connections of private enterprises, and puts forward the microstructure of political competition and the framework of dynamic evolution theory based on the dynamics analysis theory. The paper also presents the competition field of political connections among private enterprises and develops the conceptions and models of competitive field energy and competitive field entropy. Furthermore ,this paper presents enterprise political association competition field gauss theorem and loop theorem, and proves the competition field entropy convex theorem as well as the maximum entropy principl. This study not only helps to better know the private enterprise competitiveness, and promote the academic discussion on the political relevance of private enterprises, but also helps private enterprises to know more about Chinese political and market environment, in order to develop more effective political strategy to promote enterprise competition ability and enterprise value.
出处 《中国工业经济》 CSSCI 北大核心 2011年第9期98-107,共10页 China Industrial Economics
基金 国家自然科学基金项目"基于大股东利益的中国上市公司投资行为与效率研究"(批准号70702035) 国家自然科学基金项目"后股权分置时期大股东行为模式研究与上市公司绩效研究"(批准号70872073) 上海市社会科学基金项目"中国民营企业的政治关联与企业价值研究"(批准号2010BJB010)
关键词 政治关联 微观结构 动态演化 竞争场 信息熵 political connection microstructure dynamic evolution competition field information entropy
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参考文献20

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