我国创业板高超募之谜:利益驱使或制度使然

The Puzzle of Over-raising Capital in ChiNext:Interests-driven or Institutions-made

自我国创业板市场成立以来,"三高"问题,即高发行价、高市盈率和高超募率,就受到社会各界的普遍关注与广泛质疑。其中,"高超募"作为我国新兴转轨资本市场上的一个特有现象,对其进行研究具有重要的理论意义和政策价值。本文基于我国创业板市场首次公开发行(IPO)高超募现象的形成机理,收集2009年9月至2010年10月我国创业板市场发行的142只IPO数据进行实证检验。研究结果表明,我国创业板IPO高超募现象并非承销商抬高股票定价以获取高额承销佣金所致,"承销佣金利益驱使假说"并不成立;而《证券法》第五十条关于股票上市条件的规定,即公开发行股份应当达到公司股份总数的25%或10%以上,直接导致创业板公司在IPO时发行股票数量过多,这才是我国创业板高超募现象的制度根源。

＂Tri-highs＂ phenomena （i.e., high issue prices, high P/E and high over-raising capital） have received extensive attention and suspicions from the very beginning of ChiNext＇s establishment. As a unique phenomenon in Chinese developing and transitional capital market, researches on the＂high over-raising＂ phenomenon are of great theoretical and policy importance. Based on a mechanical model of high over-raising, the paper proposes two hypotheses and then uses the data of 142 ChiNext＇s initial public offerings （IPOs） between September 2009 and October 2010 to test them empirically. While we find little support to the interests-driven hypothesis, i.e., underwriters＇ incentive to boost their underwriting fees causes the ＂high over-raising＂ phenomenon through pricing IPOs high deliberately, we show that Securities Law＇s Provisions of Listing requirements are institutional roots of ＂high over-raising＂.