摘要
当事人之间的权力不对称容易导致董事的忠诚义务的形成,忠实义务等董事的义务的产生与一方拥有权力而另外一方相对没有权力的情况有关,但是其更重要的原因是委托人对受托人产生的信赖。美国的董事承担注意义务和忠诚义务的渊源是受托义务,日本则是委任合同,两者有所不同。信托理论能更好地说明忠诚义务产生的原因。而与信托理论相比,委任理论对信赖的保护的必要性程度相对比较低,委任理论只能说明注意义务的产生。
The power asymmetry between parties is easy to cause the formation of the loyalty duty of the director, generation of duty of loyalty and director duties is related with that one has the power and the other party relatively has little power, but the more important reason is the trust of principal to the trustee. The origin of duty of care and loyalty to the obligations of United States is the fiduciary obligations, Japan has the commission contract, and both are different. Trust theory can better explain the causes of loyalty obligations. And compared with the trust theory, the necessity of appointment to the protection is relatively low degree; appointment theory can explain the generation of duty of care.
出处
《经济与管理》
CSSCI
2011年第9期43-45,共3页
Economy and Management
关键词
信托
委任
董事义务
trust
appointment
director obligations