信息不对称条件下财政支持森林保险策略研究

Financial Support under Asymmetric Information the Policy for Forestry Insurance

森林保险具有准公共物品性质。目前财政补贴政策在森林保险中遇到的问题来自于政府与保险公司之间的信息不对称,从而导致补贴政策的低效率。文章从信息经济学角度通过建立斯坦科尔博格（stackbarg）博奕模型,论证不对称信息环境下政府对保险公司经营森林保险的财政补贴的效率损失及保险公司策略性反应。由此认为,政府应改进与保险公司之间的关系,积极取信于保险公司,使企业充分认识到财政政策具有长期的执行效力与可信度,从而使保险公司意识到努力增加森林保险供给才是其真正利益所在。

Forest insurance is quasi-public goods. Subsidies in the current financial problems encountered in the for- est insurance, asymmetry between government and insurance companies from the information, resulting in low effi- ciency of subsidies. From information economics point of view through the creation of Stan Cole Borg （stack barg） Game model, the paper demonstrate the government under asymmetric information environment forest insurance in- surance company financial subsidies to efficiency losses and insurance company＇s strategic response. Government should improve the relationship between the insurance company, active gain the trust of insurance companies, to en- able enterprises to fully understand the long-term fiscal policy effectiveness of the implementation and credibility, so that the insurance company is aware of efforts to increase the supply of forest insurance is the real interests for the insurance business.