逻辑主义意义理论的“在场形而上学”根基

Metaphysics of Presence and the Root of the Logical Theory of Meaning

尽管弗雷格反对把名称的涵义和句子的思想与表象混为一谈,但是在表象、客观事物与思想三者之中,弗雷格认为最可靠的还是表象。这表明他仍然遵循了笛卡尔式的"在场形而上学"原则。罗素把某个名称所代表的对象能否被我们感知作为判定这个名称是专名还是摹状词的标准,甚至把它看做是决定一个名称的意义的标准,充分表明他以摹状词理论为核心的意义学说的经验主义本质。维特根斯坦的语言图像说认为"语言的界限就是我的世界的界限",实际上是把"我的思想的界限"看做世界的界限,这表明他的哲学是一种彻头彻尾的"唯我论"。逻辑经验主义把"可证实性"作为命题意义的标准,归根到底还是把感觉经验作为意义的标准,这充分表明逻辑经验主义及其"可证实性"意义标准的表象主义、唯我论和"在场形而上学"本质。

Though Frege emphasized that we should not identify the reference of a name or the sense of a sentence with representations, he still thought that the representations in our mind are most reliable. This means that he still adhered to the principle of ＂Metaphysics of Presence＂, which was put forward by Descartes for the first time. According to Russell ,what made descriptions different from proper names is that they don＇ t denote any object which limit of my world. ＂ This means that his philosophy is a kind of Solipsism. Logical Empiricism took verification as the criterion to decide whether a proposition is meaningful, which means that it also adhered to Solipsism or ＂Metaphysics of Presence＂.