存款保险、市场约束与国有商业银行对策选择

The Deposit Insurance,Market Restraint and Countermeasures of State-owned Commercial Banks

立足于真实银行市场是不完全竞争市场的实际,采集1999～2010年国内15家主要商业银行的数据,通过改进Salop模型,构建不完全竞争市场条件下市场约束与存款保险理论模型,并对其相互关系和影响进行实证分析。结果表明,由于国有商业银行在隐性存款保险下,放贷冲动更强烈,吸收存款力度大,存款利率高,使得居民不会过于关注银行本身的风险水平,从而削弱了市场约束的力量。

On the basis of the fact that the real bank market is an imperfect competition market,the paper collects the data of the country＇s leading commercial bank during 1999-2010,improves the Salop model,constructs the theory model of market constraint and deposit insurance in the condition of imperfect complete competition and analyses the mutual relationship and impact.The results shows that,in the condition of recessive deposit,the state-owned commercial has more strong impulse in lending,deposit and a higher interest,which leads the residents pay less attention on the bank risk level,thereby the market constraint force is weakened.