中国农民专业合作社社员机会主义行为的约束机制分析

Study on the Constraint Mechanism of Farmer Specialized Cooperative Member's Opportunistic Behaviorin China

严重的委托—代理问题已成为制约中国农民专业合作社持续健康发展的重要因素,解决这一问题的关键是在合作社的框架下不断完善激励机制和约束机制。完善这些机制不仅有利于防范合作社经营者侵害大多数社员的利益,也有利于约束社员的机会主义行为,以实现合作社的整体利益。理论界对如何约束合作社经营者的研究已很多,本文在此主要集中梳理和分析对社员机会主义行为的约束机制,这些机制包括经营者的监督、划片经营制度、事后奖惩机制和定价机制。合作社利用这其中的一种或多种机制能够有效改变社员实施和不实施机会主义行为的收益和成本预期,从而约束社员的机会主义行为。

The Serious principal-agent problem has been an important factor impeding the sustained and healthy development of farmer specialized cooperative in China.The key to solve this problem is continuously improving the incentive mechanisms and constraint mechanisms in the framework of co-operatives.Improving these mechanisms is not only to prevent the cooperative manager against the interests of members,but also to restrict opportunistic behavior of cooperative members in order to achieve the general interests of cooperative as a whole.There are too many researches on the topic that how to constrain the manager.So this paper just mainly focuses on analyzing the constraint mechanisms of cooperative members' opportunistic behavior.The constraint mechanisms include manager's monitoring mechanism,scribing operating system,mechanism of rewards and punishments afterwards,and pricing mechanism.Cooperative uses one or more mechanisms of these can effectively change members' expected benefits and costs of exercising opportunistic behavior or not.And this can constrain cooperative member's opportunity behavior.