关系差序偏好、董事会羊群行为与掏空

Preference of the Differential Mode of Guanxi,Herd Behavior of the Board and Tunneling

受中国文化影响,董事在决策时存在关系差序偏好,加上群体决策时的羊群行为,会影响董事会独立性,加剧对公司的掏空。本文以资金占用和盈余管理作为掏空的代理变量,实证结果表明:董事会中存在某种可观测的关系结构会加剧掏空,且在关系差序偏好的作用下,随着关系结构的强弱,掏空的形式或掏空的程度会有所不同;董事长变更会导致关系格局发生改变,加剧资金占用;领取报酬的董事数量越多,羊群行为越易形成,资金占用额越大。

There is a preference about the differential mode of Guanxi affected by Chinese culture, when directors make decisions. There is also herd behavior in group decision. So the independence of the board will be affected, and the probability of tunneling will increase. Intercorporate loans and earnings management are used as proxy variables of tunneling. The empirical result indicates that： if there are some Guanxi structures in the board, which can be observed, the probability of tunneling will increase. Affected by the differential mode of Guanxi, as the Guanxi structures change, the mode or degree of tunneling will be different： the change of chairman of the board will lead to the change of Guanxi structures, which makes intercorporate loans increased; The more directors who receive compensation, the easier herd behavior forms, and the more intercorporate loans are.