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心灵哲学中二元论和自然主义发展的新趋势——以查默斯自然主义二元论为线索 被引量:4

The New Tendency of Naturalism and Dualism from the Opposing to the Fusion——The Probing into Chalmers's Naturalistic Dualism
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摘要 当代心灵哲学中的自然主义和二元论除了延续原来的对立、攻讦的关系之外,还出现了相互靠拢、吸纳、融合的新趋势,乃至诞生了融两者于一体的自然主义二元论。查默斯认为,意识是一种自然现象,其产生和存在既离不开物理实在所表现出的功能组织,又根源于物理实在隐结构中存在的"心原"。意识一经产生,就有自己不同于物理实在的独立存在地位。自然主义二元论尽管还只是一种猜想,但完成了对传统二元论的许多超越,在承认意识有依赖于物理实在的一面的同时,还把意识结构与大脑结构的同型关系、意识与功能组织的协变关系概括成心理物理规律。由于不完全对立于科学,因此有助推人工智能发展的作用。 Naturalism and dualism in contemporary philosophy of mind, not only remain the traditional relationship of opposing and attacking to each other, but also come to appear a new tendency to move closer, assimilate,and combine mutually, or even as a result naturalistic dualism which dissolved both was born. David Chalmers contends that consciousness is a kind of natural phenomenon, that it can't independent of the functional organization exhibited by physical reality for its emergence and existence, and originates from the "protopsyche" existing in the implicit structure of physical reality. Consciousness, once produced, has its own independent existence other than that of physical reality. Although naturalistic dualism is iust a coniecture, it is beyond the traditional dualism in many respects. It admits that consciousness depends on the physical reality, in the mean time, it generalizes the isomorph of consciousness and the brain structure , the covariance of consciousness and the {unetional organization as psychophysical laws. It can contribute to the development of artificial intelligence for not opposing to science entirely.
作者 高新民
出处 《学术月刊》 CSSCI 北大核心 2011年第9期43-50,共8页 Academic Monthly
关键词 意识 二元论 自然主义 自然主义二元论 consciousness, dualism, naturalism, naturalistic dualism
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参考文献10

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