跨业创新对金融稳定冲突的两类解释——结构套利与“竞次”博弈

Two Explanations for the Conflict between Conglomeration and Financial Stability——Structure Arbitrage and Game of "Race to the Bottom"

为应对全球化和多元化竞争趋势,跨业经营逐渐成为国际银行业的主流发展模式。但是,这种模式可能从跨期风险分担机制的瓦解、反馈效应的强化、跨业风险传染三个方面冲击金融体系稳定性。冲突源于两个方面,一是金融机构对结构性套利的追逐,主要体现在杠杆率、信息披露与消费者保护等方面;二是监管机构之间的博弈。通过对比分析国际上主要监管体制的审慎性效果以及银行、证券和保险业监管差异,本文考察了利益冲突诱发的监管"竞次"博弈。国际金融审慎监管改革在一定程度上有助于推动商业银行回归传统业务,提升银行体系稳定性,但是,对于监管体系与市场经营模式配置错位的改革却远未完成。

In order to cope with globalization and multiple competition, conglomeration became the predominant business model of international banking industry. However, such model would impact financial stability through the impairment of intertemporal risk sharing mechanism, the reinforcement of feedback effect and cross-sectional risk contagion. The leverage ratio, conflict lies in two aspects： one is the structure arbitrage of financial institutions, which is reflected on information disclosure and consumer protection; the other is the game among regulatory institutions. Through the comparison of prudential regulation of major regulatory systems and the gap between regulations of the banking, securities and insurance industries, the article examines the game of ＂race to the bottom＂ triggered by interest conflict. The international financial regulatory reform can help promote traditional businesses in commercial banks and increase the stability of the banking industry. Yet the reform concerning the mismatch of regulatory system and operational model still has a long way to go.